Full transparency on every security analysis performed on the Bouclier protocol. All findings, fixes, and accepted risks are documented here.
All five core contracts have undergone static analysis (Slither v0.11.5), symbolic execution (Mythril v0.24.8), invariant fuzzing (Foundry, 128K+ calls), and manual security review. All identified issues have been resolved or formally accepted with documented rationale. Certora formal verification specs are written and pending cloud execution. Third-party audit is planned pre-mainnet.
| ID | Severity | Finding | Status | Resolution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S-1 | Info | Locked ether in PermissionVault | Fixed | Added receive() revert + rescueETH() |
| S-2 | Low | Reentrancy-events in emergencyRevoke | Fixed | Event moved before external call (CEI pattern) |
| S-3 | Info | Unused return in logAction() | Acknowledged | Return value intentionally unused — annotated |
| S-4 | Info | Unused return in latestRoundData() | Acknowledged | Partial destructuring is intentional — annotated |
| S-5 | Info | Solc version pragma | Fixed | Updated to ^0.8.24 |
| Contract | Issues | SWC IDs | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|
| AgentRegistry | 0 | — | Clean |
| PermissionVault | 0 | — | Clean |
| RevocationRegistry | 0 | — | Clean |
| AuditLogger | 0 | — | Clean |
| SpendTracker | 1 | SWC-116 | Accepted — block.timestamp needed for oracle staleness |
| PermissionVault (ext) | 2 | SWC-123, SWC-101 | False positives — receive() revert by design; Solidity 0.8.24 overflow protection |
12 SWC vulnerability classes tested. All critical classes (SWC-104, SWC-106, SWC-107, SWC-110, SWC-112, SWC-113, SWC-114) returned clean across all contracts.
| ID | Property | Result |
|---|---|---|
| INV-1 | Agent count consistency | HOLDS |
| INV-2 | Revocation irreversibility | HOLDS |
| INV-3 | Audit record immutability | HOLDS |
| INV-4 | Scope revocation permanence | HOLDS |
| INV-5 | Module type invariant | HOLDS |
| INV-6 | Rolling spend monotonicity | HOLDS |
| INV-7 | Admin non-nullity | HOLDS |
| INV-8 | Revoked agent blocked | HOLDS |
| INV-9 | Grant/revoke consistency | HOLDS |
A BouclierHandler contract with 7 handler functions drives the fuzzer through realistic protocol operations including agent registration, permission grants, revocations, audit logging, spend recording, and timestamp warping.
| ID | Severity | Finding | Status | Resolution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M-1 | High | EIP-712 SCOPE_TYPEHASH mismatch | Fixed | SCOPE_TYPEHASH string did not include nonce field — violated EIP-712 spec. Corrected to include uint256 nonce. |
| M-2 | Info | Dead code in PermissionVault | Fixed | Unreachable code path removed. |
| Spec File | Contract | Rules | Key Properties |
|---|---|---|---|
| PermissionVault.spec | PermissionVault | 7 | Revoked agent always fails, binary validation result, nonce monotonicity, expired scope rejection |
| SpendTracker.spec | SpendTracker | 4 | Spend cap enforced, zero cap = no limit, rolling monotonicity |
| RevocationRegistry.spec | RevocationRegistry | 4 | Revoke always sets flag, timelock respected, double-revoke reverts |
Configuration files prepared. Execution requires CERTORAKEY API access. Will be run prior to mainnet deployment.
All 100 Solidity tests pass after all security fixes including EIP-712 SCOPE_TYPEHASH correction and oracle circuit breaker implementation.
Required for Chainlink heartbeat validation. ±15s manipulation is negligible.
Permission windows are hours/days — ±15s is irrelevant.
Stale-price revert implemented. TWAP fallback planned.
Added receive() revert and rescueETH() for accidental ETH recovery.
Events moved before external calls in emergencyRevoke to prevent reentrancy-events.
SCOPE_TYPEHASH corrected to include nonce field per EIP-712 specification.
5% deviation threshold on Chainlink price feeds with admin-refreshable anchor prices.
Vulnerability reported via the bug bounty program or direct disclosure
Security team triages severity and confirms reproducibility
Patch developed, tested with formal verification
Multi-sig approves fix. Timelock executed for non-critical
Full public disclosure with technical write-up
Execute all 15 formal verification rules via Certora Prover cloud API.
Competitive audit via Code4rena or engagement with Trail of Bits / OpenZeppelin.
$100K bounty pool — $50K critical, $10K high, $2K medium, $500 low.
We take security seriously. Report any issues through our bug bounty program.